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Abstract
The article asks why, in Western universities, the success of the academic field of com-
parative philosophy has so far failed to significantly diversify the curricula of academic 
philosophy. It suggests that comparative philosophy has mainly relied on the same ap-
proaches that have made academic philosophy Eurocentric, namely, on the history of phi-
losophy as the main mode of teaching and researching philosophy. Further, post-compar-
ative philosophy and transcultural studies are presented as providing tools to address the 
foundations of the institutional parochialism of academic philosophy, while preserving 
one of the most fundamental tenets of philosophy—the quest for universal knowledge 
that transcends cultural particularities.
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Introduction1
The debates on what is philosophy, whether or not philosophy is essentially 
a product of a European way of thinking that starts with Ancient Greece, and 
whether or not the term “philosophy” is a misnomer when applied to the various 
ways of thinking that formed and persist outside of the European cultural uni-
verse, are certainly not new ones within Western academia (for one particular 
discussion on this topic see Defoort 2001; Raud 2006; Defoort 2006). One reason 
for continuing discussion of these and similar questions and the reason for them 
being raised more pressingly is the context of the institutional structure of the 
university system, and how it defines the academic discipline of philosophy as 
taught in Western universities.
Increasingly more vocal and persuasive objections are being raised to the fact 
that philosophy departments in the West—with only minor exceptions—as of 
yet do not adequately incorporate topics, texts, thinkers, terms, and even faculty 
members that originate from areas and traditions that do not fall under the broad 
umbrella term of “the West” (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016; Van Norden 2017; 
for a good collection of studies on the multiple facets of institutional racism not 
only in philosophy, but all of the academy, see Arday and Mirza 2018).
This article addresses the problem of “cultural homogeneity” or, what some have 
called the institutionalized parochialism of Western academic philosophy.2 The 
almost exclusive focus on European thinkers and ideas of European (starting 
from Ancient Greece) origin in academic philosophy is a well-known, albeit very 
complicated phenomenon that has been discussed, criticized, but also defended 
by many (Rorty 1989, 333; Derrida in Defoort 2006, 628; Heidegger 1968, 224). 
However, recently we have noticed a new and intensified wave of discontent 
with the perceived lack of diversity in academic philosophy curricula, as well as 
the lack of diversity among those who teach and study these curricula. I call it a 
new wave, as this time the discontent has spilled out of inner circles of academia 
1 Research for this article has received funding from European Social Fund (project No. 
09.3.3-LMT-K-712-0111) under grant agreement with the Research Council of Lithuania 
(LMTLT). I would like to thank Audrius Beinorius, Vilius Dranseika, Renatas Berniūnas, Paulius 
Rimkevičius (all from Vilnius University), Agnė Veisaitė (Beijing University), Geir Sigurðsson 
(University of Iceland), Ralph Weber (University of Basel), Hans-Georg Moeller (University of 
Macau), and two anonymous reviewers of Asian Studies for valuable comments and suggestions 
as to the further development of my argument.
2 In this article I will only be talking about the Western academic philosophy, by which I mean 
philosophy as the discipline taught and studied at European, North American, and Australian uni-
versities. Different—or even similar—issues with cultural homogeneity might exist in academic 
philosophy conducted at African, Indian, Chinese, and other non-Western universities, but that is 
beyond the scope of the present article.
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and is receiving increasingly more attention in both the cultural and mainstream 
media, thus being presented to an increasingly wider public (Schwitzgebel 2015; 
Salami 2015; Garfield and Van Norden 2016; Levine 2016). In addition, this time 
these critical voices are not only coming from professional philosophers (SOAS 
Students’ Union, 2018).
Science popularization, cultural, and even mass media have reported objections 
both from professional academics and students alike as to the current cultural and 
geographical scope of academic philosophy. The Guardian has run several arti-
cles on a widely reported and harshly criticized requirement by the student union 
of SOAS to diversify philosophy courses by including thinkers from Africa and 
Asia (Whyman 2017; Malik 2017).3
The conference “Minorities and Philosophy”, organized by the graduate students 
of University of Pennsylvania, has inspired an opinion piece in The New York 
Times by the academics Jay L. Garfield and Bryan W. Van Norden, challenging 
the departments that only offer courses on Western philosophy to name them-
selves appropriately: “Department of European and American Philosophy” (Gar-
field and Van Norden 2016). The opinion piece resulted in a whole book expli-
cating the argument in detail (Van Norden 2017). The Los Angeles Times pub-
lished an op-ed by Eric Schwitzgebel (2015) claiming that U.S. college philoso-
phy classes are missing Chinese philosophers for no valid reason. Peter Levine 
(2016) noted that “philosophy is a remarkably un-diverse discipline”, and argued 
that this lack of diversity is blocking its progress. Julian Baggini, presenting ten 
Asian, Middle Eastern, and African schools of philosophy that should be “better 
known” to Westerners, even argues that “the parochialism of Western intellectual 
goes far deeper than willful ignorance of non-Western traditions”, pointing out 
that American pragmatists are largely ignored in Britain (Baggini 2019). In a sim-
ilar vein, Dag Herbjørnsrud notes that institutionalized philosophy is segregated 
not only culturally, but also by gender, and claims that, “philosophy departments, 
journals, and curriculum lists are often as lacking in diversity now as they were in 
the 1970s” (Herbjørnsrud 2018).
One reason for holding on to the old ways might be that inclusion of new materi-
als, thinkers, traditions, texts into university curricula is also a matter of struggle 
over very limited institutional resources. These considerations may have creat-
ed what Chakrabarti and Weber call the “political resistance against compara-
tive philosophy” within academia (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 17). I want to 
3 It seems to be somewhat telling that these requirements have been also reported with misleading 
headlines, suggesting that the students demanded Kant and Plato be removed from syllabus “be-
cause they are white” (as in Turner 2017).
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sidestep these political reasons, and, first, look instead if there is something in the 
way academic philosophy has come to be conducted today, that creates, fosters, 
and upholds the parochialism of Western philosophy departments.
Sources of Monoculturality of Academic Philosophy
One position that looks for reasons directly where the problem lies, that is, in 
the academic discipline of philosophy, is a study by Peter Park (2013) on the 
racist overtones in the formation of Western philosophical canon. In order to 
understand how our current dominating philosophical canon has formed, Park 
suggests that we look at how and when a currently mainstream version of the his-
tory of philosophy came into being. This is important, because, as Park notes, “by 
recounting philosophy’s past (what philosophy was), the history of philosophy 
teaches what philosophy is (the concept of philosophy)” (Park 2013, 1). More-
over, at contemporary universities the dominant mode of teaching philosophy 
at undergraduate and graduate level takes the history of philosophy as the main 
framework of teaching the subject. This, of course, is understandable as an intro-
ductory step. However, it still means that the academic discipline of philosophy 
and its curricula are directly linked with the dominant view of the origins and 
history of philosophy.
Unlike the dominant view in the current curricula of history of philosophy, Park 
shows that “extremely few early modern historians of philosophy regarded the 
Greeks as the first philosophers” (ibid., 70). Instead, most of histories of philos-
ophy in the 17th century began with “ancient Asians (Chaldeans, Jews, Persians, 
Indians, Phoenicians, and Phrygians) and Africans (Egyptians, Ethiopians, and 
Libyans) before turning to the philosophies of the ancient Europeans (Thracians, 
Druids, and Greeks)” (ibid., 71). Park goes on to show that the formation of the 
philosophical canon as we receive it today in most philosophy departments oc-
curred in late eighteenth—early nineteenth centuries, when the targeted exclusion 
of Africa and Asia from the history of philosophy started. This was initiated by 
Christoph Meiners (1747–1810) and was strongly developed by mainly Kantian 
philosophers (ibid., 76ff).
Meiners directly and falsely attacked the “delusion” of an Oriental origin of sci-
ence as an alleged forgery by “non-Greek” writers to conform his story of “world-
ly wisdom” (Weltweisheit) with assumptions about the racial superiority of Eu-
rope. Thus, even if non-Europeans had anything of intellectual worth, according 
to Meiners, their ideas needed the cultural touch of the Greeks (i.e. Europeans) in 
order for these to come out of a “perennial childhood” (Meiners in Park 2013, 79). 
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Studying both the ethnological work of Meiners and his history of philosophy, 
Park comes to a conclusion that “racism and Eurocentric history of philosophy 
go hand in hand” (Park 2013, 82). This particular Eurocentric version of history 
of philosophy is still a mainstream position and the exclusivist, homogenizing 
effects of it are further fortified by the virtual substitution of philosophy with 
history of philosophy in contemporary universities.
This explains the charge against the current Eurocentric nature of academic phi-
losophy as a form of “institutional racism” (Garfield in Van Norden 2017, xix). 
We might take a less confrontational stance and say that the current Eurocentrism 
of most of Western philosophical programs is more a sign of inertia, rather than 
of a stubborn racism. However, we still can expect that as long as the history of 
philosophy will be by far the most dominant axis around which the philosophy 
curricula are structured across Euro-American philosophy departments, the na-
ture of academic philosophy will not only keep its Eurocentric bias, but will also 
likely stay susceptible to allegations of racism.
Adding to this exclusivist and purist vision of the origins of philosophy, two 
other aspects of how the discipline of philosophy functions in academia enhance 
its resistance to calls for diversification. There are: (a) philosophy’s striving for 
universalism, and (b) philosophy departments’ relative isolation from empirical 
sciences in today’s departmentalized and highly specialized university system.
One of widely held agreements is that all types of philosophy strive for a univer-
sal type of knowledge. Knowledge that defies the ramifications of any one place, 
time, or culture. Philosophers want to know what the human condition is, and not 
only what were the conditions for human development and flourishing in Ancient 
Greece, Enlightenment era Germany, or pre-imperial China. Even if we want 
to avoid the term “universal” as too unifying and absolute, we may simply say, 
along with Rein Raud, that philosophy seeks “to clarify the nature of things on the 
most abstract level” (Raud 2006, 621). This quest for an overarching explanatory 
system, however, has to arise from the particular details on the ground. That is 
why the great philosophers of the past were mastering methods and knowledge 
that in the contemporary university fall within the competence of the departments 
of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and even health and natural sciences. 
On the other hand, it also has to overcome the various differences and inconsist-
encies that are present in the concrete details on the ground. The philosophical 
mind strives for and attains the knowledge that incorporates contingencies into 
the bigger picture.
This “universalist thrust”, Baggini claims, has many merits and yielded many 
positive results for philosophy and philosophers (Baggini 2018). But at the same 
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time, a universalist thrust can lead to a short-sighted and a mistaken view, once 
it is followed exclusively from within one cultural milieu without any exposure 
to others. As Wolfgang Welsch noted, the incompleteness of one culture “is not 
visible from inside the culture itself, since aspiration to the totality induces taking 
pars pro toto” (Welsch 1999, 222).
And this exposure to other (philosophical) cultures in academic philosophy is 
prevented from the outset by the purist Eurocentric vision of the origins and his-
tory of philosophy. In other words, a particularity is taken to be universality, and 
postcolonial thinkers have talked a lot about how this ends up being “Eurocentric 
hegemony posing as universalism” (Appiah 1992, 58; quoted in Baggini 2018).
Furthermore, the misled and misleading “posing as universalism” within academ-
ic philosophy does not get challenged and exposed as much as it could, because 
of philosophy departments’ relative isolation from the empirical sciences in con-
temporary universities. To be sure, plenty of philosophers in their philosophical 
practice pay very close attention to empirical data. Sarkissian and Nichols point 
out that “today, many philosophers working in the philosophy of mind, philoso-
phy of science, moral philosophy, and applied ethics routinely and systematically 
draw upon the social, behavioural, and biological sciences to inform their theo-
ries” (Sarkissian and Nichols 2016, 354). However, in philosophy as an academic 
discipline taught at universities, the data is often subordinated to the neat system-
ic “grand picture”. As Nicholas Rescher stresses in his article on philosophical 
methodology, we do not start our philosophical quest empty handed, but rather 
use the data provided by common sense beliefs, the scientific facts of the day, and 
personal experience (Rescher 2001, 5). However, Rescher further notes, “there 
is nothing sacred and sacrosanct about the data. (...) For those data are by no 
means unproblematic. (...) What we owe to these data, in the final analysis, is not 
acceptance but merely respect” (ibid., 6; emphasis in the original). While I agree 
completely with the spirit of Rescher’s claim, but when coupled with philoso-
phy’s universalist thrust, what academic philosophy ends up of offering is often 
only a lip-service of “respect” to the data, without much of obligation to accept 
it. Field research and empirical data are not altogether discarded, that would be 
deemed unscientific, but are rarely made a substantial part of discussion and ar-
gument in the academic discipline of philosophy. The respect for data is much 
more binding in other academic disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. 
Psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists are more confined by empirical data, 
as their respect necessarily has to encompass a fair degree of acceptance of data.
To be fair, we see a significant attempt to change this situation from within aca-
demic philosophy in the form of “experimental philosophy”, or X-Phi for short, 
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an academic field that has been growing rapidly since early 2000s. Experimental 
philosophers not only incorporate empirical data in their thinking and arguments, 
but also design and carry out empirical research where the needed data is lacking 
or is inadequate. While I strongly believe that further development of X-Phi has 
great promise to help culturally diversify academic philosophy in the future (see 
Sarkissian and Nichols 2016 for similar position), so far it has mostly dealt with 
questions and concepts originating from European philosophical cultures.
Universality might be a goal of philosophical activity achieved through rigorous 
thought and observation by a philosopher who engages philosophical thinking 
as a way of life. However, the teaching of academic philosophy does not usually 
start from the same point as the greatest philosophers have started. Universal 
claims, highly abstract concepts, and overarching categorizations, instead of be-
ing arrived at, are mostly the starting point in the philosophical training starting 
from undergraduates. The introduction to philosophy at university rarely if ever 
starts with careful observation and detailed description of the particular, the dif-
ferent, the accidental, and contingent. It starts rather with the outcomes of this 
“universalist thrust”, that is, with the historical recounting of the biggest ideas 
formulated by the biggest thinkers. It starts from the idealized, the universal, the 
essential. Prescriptions how we should see humans and their environment over-
shadow any description of the variety of ways how humans and their environ-
ment actually are. All the particularities are left for the other university depart-
ments, which makes academic philosophy relatively blind and deaf to cultural 
diversity, compared to other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. 
Hans-Georg Moeller points out the following uniqueness of academic philoso-
phy: “unlike the academic field of Religious Studies, which largely developed as 
an offshoot of anthropology and related disciplines and thus affirmed a plurality 
of religions, academic philosophy in the West was hardly open to the notion of 
philosophies in the plural” (Moeller 2018, 36).4 Thus, this combination of a de-
liberately (and relatively recently) distorted story about the Eurocentric origins 
of philosophy, together with the thrust for universal knowledge and the relative 
isolation of philosophy departments from other departments in the humanities, 
social and natural sciences, has put philosophy in a rather unique place of contin-
uing monoculturality.
4 Rein Raud (2006) suggests six criteria that would enable more flexible definition of the term “philos-
ophy”, which would be inclusive of cultural and geographical diversity and could, in Raud’s opinion, 
provide the theoretical grounds for, what Moeller later has called, the “notion of philosophies in the 
plural”. While I agree with Raud and his position contributes a lot, my underlying argument through-
out this article is that the biggest incentive for diversification of academic philosophy will not come 
from discovery or creation of theoretical grounds, but from intensified practice of actual philosophiz-
ing that draws ideas and concepts indiscriminately from various cultural sources.
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Failure of Comparative Philosophy to Diversify Academic 
Philosophy
What makes the issue of “cultural homogeneity” in current Western academia 
truly surprising is that it persists despite the fact that the research and education 
on non-Western philosophy in Western universities has never been in a better po-
sition. So-called comparative philosophy5 enjoys great interest both from scholars 
and the wider public. There are journals devoted to non-European philosophy, 
established journals of “general” philosophy regularly publish articles of a com-
parative nature, PhD theses and books on various non-Western philosophical 
topics are increasing in number, and professional associations help philosophers 
working with non-Western materials get institutional acknowledgement within 
Western academia (see also Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 4). What is probably 
most important of all, new and heavily commentated translations of non-Western 
canon are being printed and reprinted showing a wide, shared demand. These 
translations often specifically focus on revealing the philosophical significance 
and uniqueness of these non-Western materials both in comparison with Eu-
ro-American or other non-Western tradition(s) of past and present, and also their 
relevance to the lives of contemporary human beings. This, however, does not 
mean that charges of Eurocentrism against academic philosophy, especially how 
it is taught in Western universities, are not factually accurate. On the contrary, 
they are, and sadly so (for data or links to data see Schwitzgebel 2015; 2019; Van 
Norden 2017, 2–3; Herbjørnsrud 2018). What deserves attention here is rather 
a question as to why the obvious success of an academic field of comparative 
philosophy has not—as of yet—translated into a significant degree of diversi-
fication of the academic discipline of philosophy? And this diversity, the data 
shows, is also lacking in the structure of philosophy departments, faculty, hiring 
decisions, and the contents of philosophy curricula. I propose that this is because 
the academic field of comparative philosophy has mainly relied on the same at-
titudes and approaches that made academic philosophy Eurocentric in the first 
place. Specifically, comparative philosophy has formed based on and, to a large 
degree, has remained overly reliant on, the history of philosophy as the main 
mode of teaching and researching. As Ganeri notes, “the ambition of comparative 
5 Chakrabarti and Weber (2016, 3–5) show that there is no common and satisfactory definition for 
the term “comparative philosophy”, and maybe there cannot be. Despite these difficulties and for 
the sake of convenience, in this article I take the term “comparative philosophy” to also encompass 
all other terms used in Western academia that name non-Western philosophical tradition: Asian 
philosophy, African philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and so on. In the vast majority of cases, 
these academic fields in the West seem to involve some explicit or implicit comparison of these 
philosophies with Western philosophical ideas.
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philosophy was not to generate new philosophical insights but to protect thinkers 
in colonized countries from the peculiar form of intellectual servitude colonial-
ism sought to impose” (Ganeri 2016, 135). This leaves comparative philosophy 
entangled in the inherently Eurocentric vocabulary and academic framework of 
academic philosophy, and does not allow comparative philosophy to radically 
challenge the extant Eurocentric orientation of the discipline. As an illustration I 
will briefly discuss the academic field of Chinese philosophy at modern univer-
sities. Variations among different subfields of non-European philosophies can be 
important here, but the main story, I believe, would remain valid.
The initial stages of research into the Chinese intellectual world, as Blitstein notes, 
grew up in the West from area studies (in this case, Chinese studies), where a geo-
graphical area is the prime object and binding focus of a scholarly study and they 
were further developed as “history of Chinese philosophy” or “history of Chinese 
thought” (Blitstein 2016, 137). The origins of it can be traced to classical Sinolog-
ical studies, initiated in the nineteenth century, largely by missionaries and colo-
nial administrative institutions that had a strong emphasis on language (primarily 
classical Chinese) and texts. As Blitstein notes, although this branch of scholars 
have also engaged in philosophical (as well, as religious and literary) discussions, 
especially the ones inherited from the Enlightenment philosophers, their academ-
ic identity was much more rooted in philology than philosophy (ibid., 144–45). It 
means that a significant number of academics who worked with Chinese thought 
traditions did not identify themselves as philosophers. Such research did not have 
the “universalistic thrust” characteristic and indispensable for philosophy, and 
it did not attempt to challenge and change Eurocentric orientation of academic 
philosophy. Later, some departure from the mainly philological orientation fol-
lowed, as the generation of scholars in the first part of the twentieth century built 
their academic identities not only around the study of China, but also around a 
set of methodologies of other academic disciplines in the humanities and social 
sciences, mostly history, archaeology, or sociology, and, eventually, philosophy. 
But initially, the academic field of Chinese philosophy was started not in West-
ern, but in modern Chinese universities.
Along with introduction of Western style universities into China in the early 
twentieth century, the Western type of academic philosophy was been introduced. 
Accordingly, the making of Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline started 
with the writing and publishing of the first histories of Chinese philosophy by 
Hu Shi (1919), and then later by Feng Youlan (1931). Apparently, the Western 
academic framework of history of philosophy was taken as the form, and “Chi-
nese philosophy” was modelled and framed accordingly. Hu Shi, for example, in 
his introductory chapter, where he explains the methodology of his trailblazing 
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History of Chinese Philosophy, quotes mostly Western authors, and Cua noted 
German Windelband was the main influence for Hu (Cua 2003, 10). In this pro-
cess, traditional categories of Chinese knowledge were translated into modern 
categories of disciplinary knowledge with a Western “philosophical terminology 
and historical and systematic framework” (Moeller 2018, 37–38). This locked up 
the academic field of Chinese philosophy in a vicious circle that Ganeri describes 
as: “make your use of reason like ours (in which case what extra value does your 
philosophy bring to the table?), or admit that you are outside reason and not ac-
tually engaged in philosophy at all” (Ganeri 2016, 136). And a lot of scholars in 
comparative philosophy have willingly or not succumbed to this imperative by 
putting Chinese authors, texts, terminology into a framework of Western con-
cepts, philosophical questions, and ideological rivalries that have formed in par-
ticular historical and cultural settings, but are, nevertheless, used as universal 
reference points and measuring sticks.
Thus Chinese philosophy (or, more generally, comparative philosophy) has only 
limited resources to impact changes in the (still) Eurocentric departments of phi-
losophy while the history of philosophy remains the dominant mode and frame-
work in which comparative philosophy functions. It is difficult to make a case that 
Chinese philosophers have to be taught within the introductory course into ethics, 
if we see these Chinese philosophers as simply “similar” to consequentialists, de-
ontologists, or virtue ethicists. Western thinkers who formed the vocabularies and 
main arguments of these mainstream branches of ethical thought will always be 
more eloquent, more rounded, more precise in their own game than their Chinese 
(especially, historical) counterparts who were forming their own vocabularies 
and their own philosophical arguments. As we saw earlier, Park (2013) showed 
that the current mainstream understanding of history of philosophy is a product of 
the intellectual concerns of modernity. Similarly, as Moeller notes, comparative 
philosophy is also historically connected to modernity (Moeller 2018, 31). Thus, 
both the parochialism of academic philosophy and inability of comparative phi-
losophy to challenge and shatter it are the fruits of the same tree.
What Should Comparative Philosophers Do?
If my analysis is correct so far, then it follows that diversification of philosophy 
as an academic discipline would be facilitated by a significant—but, obviously, 
not a complete—move away from the mode of history of philosophy and his-
tory of ideas as the dominating framework of academic and comparative phi-
losophy, and towards the mode of active philosophizing. Historical and cultural 
267Asian Studies VIII (XXIV), 2 (2020), pp. 257–280
contextualization, which can be adequately achieved only through a rigid study 
of history of ideas, is a necessary foundation, but it has to be complemented 
by actual reconstruction, reinvention, and reformulation of the inherited philo-
sophical classifications and technical philosophical terminologies in working our 
novel ways to address current problems surrounding current societies of current 
people. I want to suggest that two academic approaches—one from within com-
parative philosophy and one from outside—are going in this direction and, there-
fore, have the most promise to shatter and change the present monoculturality of 
academic philosophy.
As a position from within the so-called “comparative philosophy”, I will pres-
ent the idea of “fusion philosophy”, recently suggested by Chakrabarti and We-
ber (2016) and the idea of “post-comparative philosophy” suggested by Moeller 
(2018). Although these ideas were developed somewhat separately, I argue that 
there is a common thread running through them, one that pushes for overcoming 
what I have called an overly concentration on history of ideas vis-à-vis actual 
philosophizing within comparative philosophy. For the sake of convenience, I 
will hereby combine both these positions under the common name of “postcom-
parative philosophy”.
Postcomparative philosophy admits that, in Ganeri’s words, comparative philos-
ophy is not “a branch of philosophy nor it is a distinct philosophical method: 
it is an expedient heuristic introduced at a particular moment in world history” 
(Ganeri 2016, 135), because comparison cannot be seen as a method unique to 
so-called comparativists. Comparison is a widely used and one of the main in-
struments of any philosophy, not limited to those philosophers who work with 
non-Western materials: “philosophy had always been comparative: Aristotle had 
already compared himself with Plato and other Greek philosophers he knew of; 
medieval Christian philosophy had compared itself with the Greeks” (Moeller 
2018, 31). Chakrabarti and Weber go further, claiming “that all means of knowl-
edge including direct sense perception are, indeed, at heart forms of comparison” 
(Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 3). This means that postcomparative philosophy 
contends that even in the so-called “comparative philosophy” comparison should 
only be seen as a means to one’s own creative philosophizing, not as an ultimate 
goal of academic activity. Thus, as a tool, comparative work in philosophy—and 
in the academic field of “comparative philosophy”, for that matter—is seen only 
as a stage or a phase that has to be overstepped and transcended in order for it to 
come to fruition. 
Comparison in philosophy—and “comparative philosophy”—should not be abol-
ished, discarded, or discredited. It simply has to be completed and complimented 
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with the creation of one’s own philosophical position that would be other than the 
two (or more) positions involved in the previous act of comparing. The second 
reason why “comparative philosophy” cannot stick with comparison as an ulti-
mate goal of academic research is that there are no static, stable objects that could 
be “compared”, and, more importantly, there is no neutral position from which to 
compare, just as there is no neutral agent who could compare.
There is always a certain engaged “comparer” who is looking at things from a 
particular situation, and this situation dictates certain specific conditions. And the 
comparanda (that, which are compared) are always just ahistorical generaliza-
tions that are only provisional and should always be remembered as being such.
Chakrabarti and Weber stress we must not to forget that comparison always re-
quires a third member (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 6).6 That “third” member is, 
on one hand, an idea or a concept with respect to which we make the comparison, 
and, on the other hand, the comparer himself. As Chakrabarti and Weber put it, 
“compare” turns out to be “a four-place predicate: ‘From his specific historical 
cultural context P compares A and B with respect to F’” (ibid.). What is important 
in this observation, is that if we keep in mind that this “third”— the comparer—
can never be neutral, we better embrace that she is rather proactive, that is, that 
she intentionally directs her research. It means that such a proactive researcher 
is not “comparing” two external positions with respect to a neutral “third” posi-
tion, but is really forging her own philosophical position. She might be drawing 
inspiration and insight from the first two (in positive or negative manner), but 
in the end—and most importantly—the outcome is a new and current (present) 
philosophical position. Chakrabarti and Weber call this process “fusion”, and see 
it ultimately as an act of forward looking philosophizing, rather than backward 
looking comparison. Thus, their formula could be alternatively summed up as 
“from his/her specific historical cultural context P philosophizes about F, draw-
ing inspiration, ideas from A and B”.
To give an illustration of this point, we might think—as is often the case in the 
simplistic understanding of what “comparative philosophy” entails,—that by 
comparing St. Aquinas’ and Mencius’ notions of “courage”, (Yearley 1990) or 
Confucius’ and Aristotle’s notions of “friendship”, (He 2007) we will understand 
better Aquinas’ and Mencius’ position on “courage” and Confucius’ and Aris-
totle’s position on “friendship”. Here, as the formula of Chakrabarti and Weber 
shows, we have to notice the twofold imposition of the “third” onto compari-
son of past thinkers: a comparer (either author or reader of comparison), who 
is culturally very different from any of the compared thinkers, and the current 
6 Ralph Weber, University of Basel, has first formulated this idea at some length in Weber (2014).
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terminology, that is linguistically very different from any of the compared terms. 
After all, Aquinas and Mencius didn’t use the English term “courage”. Thus, 
the culturally, linguistically, and historically sensitive comparative philosophy 
would rather set itself a goal of such comparison to understand better, deeper, 
and more adequately Aquinas’ notion of fortitudo, or Mencius’ notion of yong, or 
Aristotle’s notion of philos, or Confucius’ notion of you, peng, or pengyou. There 
is hardly deniable theoretical value and academic benefits of such historically 
oriented scholarly endeavour, especially if we see the understanding—at least in 
some degree—as a hermeneutical never ending process of cognitive refinement. 
But, if thus constructed, such scholarly endeavour has only limited practical ex-
istential philosophical value. We would only get a more complex, refined, and 
nuanced understanding of Aquinas’, Mencius’s, Aristotle’s, or Kongzi’s centuries 
old ideas. What would, however, bring a true philosophical importance to this 
process is a realization that in this way we can develop our own conceptions of 
courage or friendship, make them more consistent and robust. This new under-
standing would be supported with the ideas we got from contemplating carefully 
and multidimensionally, maybe even innovatively on fortitudo, on yong, on phi-
los, on peng, and on how these terms and philosophical positions they embody 
relate to our own current needs, conditions, understandings, challenges, and our 
own lived and experienced present. With such a realization, postcomparative phi-
losophy is all about the active and prospective process of philosophizing, and not 
about the retrospective process of balancing the books.
Thus, in order not to get caught up in the dominant, that is Western, philosoph-
ical framework, the attempt has to be made to try and look for entirely different 
kind of cultural (philosophical) contexts and cultural (philosophical) vocabular-
ies that various peoples might have used to express similar (but not identical) 
sensibilities. Burik points out a relevant distinction made by Heidegger between 
das Selbe and das Gleiche (Burik 2009, 3). So while looking for this alternative 
vocabulary that other people (cultures, philosophical systems) might have used in 
expressing similar, but not identical sensibilities, the researcher has to be ready to 
acknowledge important shifts in those sensibilities, allowing the initial question 
of interest become an importantly different, that is, other—although closely relat-
ed—question. This is what Henry Rosemont had in mind that in the comparative 
philosophy we ought to stop asking to what extent other cultures provide different 
answers to the problems that vex us, and start asking “to what extent do these 
[non-Western] texts suggest that we should be asking very different philosophi-
cal questions?” (Rosemont 1988, 66). In such a fusion, postcomparative project, 
conclusions can rarely be made in the form of statements about an initial question. 
Most likely, the initial question would change significantly. Such an investigation 
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is better seen not as a closed circle of argumentation leading to a conclusion, but 
as an open spiral of argumentation, where “conclusions” are merely new and 
different questions for subsequent investigations. In this postcomparative frame-
work, a question, if properly asked before engaging the comparison, is always 
eluding the researcher, as it lies outside of comparison.
So postcomparative philosophy criticizes “comparative philosophy” only in as 
much as it holds back and stays only in the historically oriented stage of com-
paring seemingly static and historically settled philosophical cultures, traditions, 
thinkers, texts, and concepts. Burik (2009) likens this challenge to the one that 
Heidegger levelled against philosophy: there is an important task comparative 
thinking can fulfil, but comparative philosophy must end. As Chakrabarti and 
Weber point out, comparative philosophy should not focus on “questions of se-
quence—which came first, which is the original—or questions of influence or 
direct refutation” (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 230). It should not simply make 
claim of “correct exposition” of philosophical views and positions we already 
know of. Instead, it should set itself for “solving hitherto unsolved problems pos-
sibly raising issues never raised before anywhere” (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 
22), and to do it in a vocabulary perhaps never formulated anywhere in the past. 
This is why Moeller picks out the work of Roger Ames and his collaborators Da-
vid Hall and Henry Rosemont as examples of philosophers who do step beyond 
comparative philosophy and embody the call for strengthening postcomparative 
philosophy. Moeller says their most decisive contribution lies in the creation of 
their own terminology, in the formation of their own philosophical vocabulary 
that does not evolve solely from within either of already existing philosophical 
traditions (Moeller 2018, 42). At one instance Rosemont readily admits the possi-
bility that his and Ames’ historically oriented work at adequately presenting early 
Confucian ethics—as a form of what they call “role ethics”—might turn out to 
be a “creative misreading”7 of early Confucians texts, if other, better interpreta-
tions are formulated. However, Rosemont does not see this as damaging to his 
(and Ames’) ultimate task to step over comparisons of the past ideas and formu-
late a philosophical position that resonates with the challenges we face today. In 
Rosemont’s own words: “even if we are both interpretively mistaken in attribut-
ing an ethics of roles to the early Confucians, it would not alter my basic point 
about the importance of challenging individualism and advancing an ethics of 
roles, for I could simply re-title this work ‘Role Ethics: A Different Approach to 
Moral Philosophy Based on a Creative Misreading of Early Confucian Writings’” 
(Rosemont 2015, 9). Rosemont’s and Ames’ attempt to “suitably modify” the 
7 For “role ethics” as both an interpretation of early Confucian ethics and “a moral vision for twenty 
first century” see Ames (2010), Rosemont and Ames (2016), and Rosemont (2015).
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historical materials to our modern sensibilities is conscious and explicitly stated, 
as any comparison is subordinated to the development of their own philosophical 
point (Rosemont and Ames 2016, 7). This is not to say that philosophical analy-
sis of past ideas can be wilfully manipulated or distorted. On the contrary, both 
Rosemont and Ames put a lot of effort to reconstruct a cultural context native to 
early Confucians, in order not to distort their thinking by using our own cultural 
assumptions, but not theirs (see Ames 2010, 41–85; Rosemont 2015, 89–110; 
Rosemont and Ames 2016, 17–31). However, this historically oriented work is 
seen as a groundwork and a catalyst for philosophical work that is future oriented. 
As Moeller puts it, they “employ comparative philosophy in order to eventually 
develop a post-comparative philosophy in its own right” (Moeller 2018, 43).
Similarly, Chakrabarti and Weber in their version of postcomparative philosophy 
emphasize that it “decidedly demands of the comparative philosopher not to be 
satisfied with the role of the comparatist. The comparative philosopher should 
aim beyond comparison at a philosophical argument (strictly or loosely under-
stood) that can stand on its own” (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 233). The similar 
call to function more as philosophers, not only as historians of ideas, is expressed 
by Ganeri, who pointed out that the comparative work with philosophical ideas 
“from distinct geographical regions or linguistic communities should be seen as 
being itself a creative one, (...) a form of philosophical practice, producing in time 
new measures, new philosophies, new models for the way individuals conceive of 
themselves and their place in the world” (Ganeri 2016, 140). In doing this, post-
comparative philosophy would overcome the limitations of a comparative philos-
ophy, stemming from its tendency to stay in a fixed set of divisions, philosophical 
questions and terminologies inherited from the times when philosophical investi-
gations in the West were defined exclusively by the study of the European history 
of ideas. This is also a reason why I suggest that postcomparative philosophy—in 
contrast to its earlier comparative phase—has the potential to impact a more sub-
stantial and rapid diversification of academic philosophy.
Finally, an important thing to add is that the postcomparative philosophy would 
by no means seek to annihilate all differences among the various philosophical 
cultures and traditions by incorporating them all into a single and unitary realm 
of “world philosophy”. As Moeller notes, the inclusion of non-Western philos-
ophies into the academic field of philosophy “does not necessarily lead to ‘con-
sensus’, a ‘fusion of horizons’, or a ‘future world philosophy’. Modern society is 
highly complex and not integrated by one underlying rationality or common set of 
cognitive operations” (Moeller 2018, 41). Far from seeing it as deficiency, post-
comparative philosophy takes that lack of a fully integrated, globalized version 
of “philosophy in the singular” as the means to challenge the current philosophy 
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internally “by creating a break-away semantics derived from traditions at the 
fringes of mainstream discourses” (ibid., 42). Moeller has called it an act of “re-
barbarizing ourselves”, that is, a process of making us a little less self-evident and 
transparent to ourselves.
As Chakrabarti and Weber note, this requires us to “ask ‘trans-traditional’ ques-
tions that expose philosophers’ own assumptions and vocabulary to the challenge 
of reformulating it” (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016, 13). The cultural, historical, 
and other differences of various philosophies are a driving force for the post-
comparative philosopher, because it allows her to “add clarity about the exact 
problem at hand” (ibid., 19) by exploring it from both within and outside her in-
herited philosophical culture. This explicit support for the diversity and plurality 
of (philosophical) cultures in postcomparative philosophy brings me to the aca-
demic field of transcultural studies as a natural ally that could contribute towards 
the attempts to diversify academic discipline of philosophy.
Input from Transcultural Studies
Transcultural studies is a growing academic field, and, according to some com-
mentators, the term transcultural itself “probably constitutes one of the most im-
portant and widely discussed conceptual keywords in the humanities and social 
sciences of recent years” (König and Rakow 2016, 89). However, so far it seems 
as if there is not much mutual interest or common topics between transcultural 
studies and academic philosophy. König and Rakow listed a wide range of the-
oretical fields where “transcultural paradigm” gave a “new impulse” to various 
topics that are routinely discussed within these fields, but did not mention phi-
losophy (ibid., 92). All the more telling is the fact that transcultural studies and 
the term transcultural (transculturality) is virtually absent from philosophical—
including comparative philosophy—discourse.8 This is completely to be expect-
ed, having in mind the monocultural nature of academic philosophy. I suggest, 
however, that this mutual disinterest is a lost opportunity for academic philoso-
phy. Transcultural studies are often understood as primarily a challenge to the 
traditional concept of culture (Blitstein 2016, 143; König and Rakow 2106, 91; 
Cuccioletta 2001/2002, 7; Welsch 1999). However, I see the work in this field in 
a broader sense as yet another turn of hermeneutical circle in an ongoing attempt 
8 Ralph Weber is the only philosopher I have managed to find talking about transcultural studies in 
the context of academic research of Western and non-Western philosophies (unpublished confer-
ence presentation “(How) Is Sinology about China? On the Paradigm of Transculturality”, Beijing, 
October 28–29, 2017).
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at understanding (verstehen) of different cultural systems. And in as much as phi-
losophy is a cultural system, the idea of transculturality is relevant to philosophy.
The academic field of transcultural studies has formed in a time when a range of 
academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences (cultural studies, area 
studies, anthropology, etc.) were in a similar situation as the academic discipline 
of philosophy is now. Towards the last third of the twentieth century, scholars 
from Asia and other areas of the Global South started challenging inherited ac-
ademic terminologies, categorical hierarchies, and institutional structures that 
proved inadequate to account for the diversity of people and their actual practices, 
and for the diversity of cultural processes in the real world. As Blitstein sums up, 
transcultural studies represent “a critical response to the abuses of the concept of 
culture as a heuristic tool” (Blitstein 2016, 136). The main source of these abuses 
is the traditional essentialist concept of single cultures. As Welsch points out, this 
traditional concept was developed by Herder in the late eighteenth century and 
among its most distinguished features Welsch has indicated the unificatory and 
separatory characteristics of the concept. The concept is unificatory as it purports 
homogenization: a culture allegedly makes “every act and every object an unmis-
takable instance of precisely this culture” (Welsch 1999, 194).
The concept is also separatory, as it assumes strong delimitation towards the out-
side: “every culture is, as the culture of one folk, to be distinguished and to remain 
separated from other folks’ cultures” (ibid., 195). This I find to be similar to the 
criticism towards academic philosophy that I have recounted in earlier sections. 
Mainly, the tendency in academic philosophy of assuming the one and only pos-
sible mode of rationality that made it “hardly open to the notion of philosophies in 
the plural” (Moeller 2018, 36), and the tendency to gloss over cultural borrowings 
or, at the very best, to depict them as being conducted between “intellectual tra-
ditions” that are seen as completely self-contained and separate from each other.
The authorship of the very term transculturation (transculturación) is attributed 
to the Cuban cultural anthropologist Fernando Ortiz, who in his 1940 article was 
looking for a term to substitute the at that time widely circulated “acculturation”. 
As König and Rakow state, “acculturation” in Ortiz’s opinion, “failed to express 
that processes of interaction between groups of different cultural origin do not only 
result in processes of transmission, reception, adaptation, and assimilation, but 
also lead to the transformation and amalgamation of previously distinct cultural 
elements within a new cultural synthesis” (König and Rakow 2016, 90; emphasis 
added). If we change the term “culture” to the term “philosophy”9 in this quote, we 
9 For four possible definitions of the term transcultural and its uses in current academia see König 
and Rakow (2016, 93–95).
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will recognize a similar sentiment expressed by the proponents of postcomparative 
philosophy. In earlier sections we saw that the ultimate goal in scholarly activity 
is seen by postcomparative philosophers not as “comparing” head-to-head two 
seemingly separate, self-contained, and self-sufficient philosophical systems, but 
in creating a new philosophical fusion, a new philosophical position, a new philo-
sophical identity. And transcultural studies joins in and strengthens the challenge 
that postcomparative philosophers are mounting towards the monoculturality of 
institutionalized philosophy by highlighting—as Cuccioletta does—that “one’s 
identity is not singular but multiple” (Cuccioletta 2001/2002, 6). This hybrid and 
mosaic nature of any identity is equally stressed by philosophers arguing for the 
cultural diversification of philosophy. As Ganeri notes, “in this new era every 
philosophical identity is hybrid and dynamic, criss-crossing multiple localities 
of geography and epoch, transcending each and again returning” (Ganeri 2016, 
 137–38). As transcultural studies are built on the attempts to spell out the process 
of such hybridization concealed by concepts such as “identity”, “culture”, and oth-
ers, it can provide a useful framework to challenge the supposedly monocultural 
and homogeneous nature of the concept of “philosophy”.
Looking for the most salient features of such framework, we must note that trans-
cultural studies are resting on a cluster of interrelated ideas and concepts that 
can be summed up into two main pillars, each partially overlapping with, incor-
porating, and inviting the other. Transcultural studies (a) focus on the dynamic 
(transitional, transforming) elements of cultures and people. According to Blit-
stein, transculturality “assumes that everything moves and changes; it posits that 
stasis is only the momentary interruption of motion, and that the actual flows of 
persons, things, and ideas across the world prevent the definitive consolidation of 
any boundaries” (Blitstein 2016, 139). This recognition of a constant and contin-
uous dynamic change requires full attention to the ongoing, the present, the lived 
and the practised. As Berg noted, transculturality is “a useful and fruitful concept 
if we approach to cultural items (...) with an empirical interest” (Berg 2011, 8). 
This aspect of a transcultural approach draws attention to empirical research in a 
much more natural and inevitable manner than an a priori universalistic attitude 
of much of academic philosophy. Moreover, transcultural studies (b) stress the 
relational nature of all our categories and concepts, thus opposing the unwarrant-
ed use of clearly delineated concepts such as “culture”, “society”, “class”, and so 
on (König and Rakow 2016, 95). These terms make sense only as relational, and 
not as essential notions, describing fundamentally static and stable phenomena. 
Of course, these terms can be used in an academic environment (and they surely 
are and will be used), but only as useful (if useful) shorthand terms for very com-
plex phenomena.
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Blitstein highlighted an identical structure in what he called “the (not necessar-
ily explicit) social ontology that characterizes transcultural studies” (Blitstein 
2016, 138). Blitstein labelled this social ontology as “both relational and ki-
netic” (ibid., 139). I would claim that this “not necessarily explicit” ontologi-
cal conviction is more fundamental, encompassing not only the constitution of 
social groups, but of all existence. Guilherme and Dietz, noting the different 
connotational implications of closely related terms, like “multiculturalism”, “in-
terculturality”, and “transculturality”, claim that interpretations of what these 
terms stand for “are eventually deeply rooted in cultural traditions and onto-
logical standpoints” (Guilherme and Dietz 2015, 5, emphasis added). It is an 
ontological position that sees relations as primary, in the sense that they are 
not reducible to objects involved in the relation. Or as Blitstein puts it, this 
position assumes that “relations precede isolation” (Blitstein 2016, 139). All 
existence functions as a totality of fundamentally interrelated entities, were the 
individuating properties of any “single” entity are provisional, negotiable, and 
in a constant flux of becoming.10 This idea directly relates to the philosophical 
position that some philosophers of the postcomparative bent argue for from 
the perspective of non-Western philosophical traditions (see Rosemont 2015; 
Rosemont and Ames 2016 on the relational concept of person).
Finally, transcultural studies not only draws attention to the changing, particular, 
and contingent, but also keeps up the version of “universal thrust” akin to philos-
ophy, which makes the transcultural approach a fitting framework for philoso-
phers. In the words of Slimbach:
Transcultural development begins with the realization that, amidst the 
diversity of cultural expression, we share common human potential and 
experience. From here, we discover the ways that others make sense of 
their world. In so doing we expand the range of alternative mores and 
manners, values and visions that are available to us for running our lives. 
(Slimbach 2005, 209) 
The suffix “trans-” in the term “transcultural” suggests transcending not only 
one’s borders, one’s limits, while enriching, updating oneself. It suggests also 
the possibility to step beyond the very fragmentation and separateness of various 
10 Ralph Weber first draw my attention to ontological assumptions behind the idea of transculturality. 
Weber has referenced to metaphysics of relations “distinguishing between the view of ontic struc-
tural realists who reject intrinsic natures of objects and the view that proposes seeing all relations 
as reducible to objects and that rejects the idea of irreducible relational properties” (unpublished 
conference presentation “(How) Is Sinology about China? On the Paradigm of Transculturality”, 
Beijing, October 28-29, 2017).
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cultures and philosophies. It can give rise to commonality. In this possibility lies, 
I believe, the potential appeal of the transcultural approach to the professional 
philosopher with her quest for universality that interweaves together and gives a 
due account to all observable diversity.
Conclusions
In this paper I argued that the seeming paradox that the Eurocentric parochialism 
of academic philosophy in the West persists, despite the very significant success 
and expansion of academic research on non-Western philosophical traditions, can 
be traced to and explained by an over reliance on the history of philosophy and 
history of ideas in teaching and research, in both the academic discipline of phi-
losophy and academic field of so-called comparative philosophy. My suggestion 
throughout this article was that a new kind of philosophy—one that addresses 
current issues rather than recounts the ways and concepts by which previous phi-
losophers used to address issues of their times—would necessarily foster and 
strengthen the move to culturally and linguistically diversify academic philoso-
phy. I presented positions, summed up as postcomparative philosophy, that call 
on us to go beyond the “comparison” stage of the process of recognizing various 
different philosophical cultures. As the power to diversify academic philosophy 
lies primarily in the hands of those who already are working with different cul-
tures, I suggested that this power will be unleashed by comparative scholars be-
coming more like postcomparative philosophers.
Finally, I suggested that the academic field of transcultural studies is a natural 
ally for philosophers calling for the cultural diversification of philosophy, despite 
the virtually complete absence of interactions between philosophers and scholars 
in transcultural studies to date. The concept cluster of transcultural studies—here 
crudely summed up into binary schema of dynamism and relationality—provides 
many ways to keep formulating philosophical positions that will remain challenging 
to the monocultural conception of academic philosophy. Many philosophers have 
raised and are raising similar points, regardless of their academic and/or philosophi-
cal affiliation. Even if transcultural studies do not present a new—as in “never heard 
before”—idea or concept, nevertheless, as an already well-established academic 
field with a consistent set of core ideas and methodologies it can provide philoso-
phers with a new impulse and stronger focus to keep reinventing, reformulating, and 
rearranging various ideas, regardless of the place or language of their origin.
The resistance of academic philosophy to calls for diversification is partly the 
result of the myopic condition of taking what is close (and, therefore, seems clear) 
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and making it absolute, while skipping over what is far and appears to be blurry. 
There’s a need for a lens to correct that vision, and postcomparative philosophy 
and transcultural studies provide just that. Despite my effort to give here a theo-
retical overview of the problem and theoretical hypothesis how to deal with it, 
I am convinced that the diversification of academic philosophy is unavoidable, 
because it is getting its greatest incentive from the intensifying practice of active 
philosophers in drawing ideas and concepts indiscriminately from various cul-
tural and geographical backgrounds. I believe the same vision is behind Henry 
Rosemont’s dictum, that comparative philosophy has a dubious past, a very bright 
present, and, hopefully, no future.11 As this process of philosophising across bor-
ders intensifies further, the structure and the content of academic philosophy will 
change in the manner of a Kuhnian paradigm shift.
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